Friday, December 18, 2009

Size does matter after all

Before this exercise, I consulted with many a fresh engineering graduate from prestigious schools with prestigious programs and prestige prestige prestige seeping out of every pore (as well as too many instances of jargon, Greek letters, and MIT/Cooper Union pride [forget about Polytech]). Why did the levees break, and why did no one do anything despite seeing it coming?

There were several answers. First off, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers tend to recruit the "shittier" people from the bottom of that barrel; the good ones are quickly picked up by prestigious (sigh) firms. Just like in Baruch, most of the underachievers cruise by by riding on the back of their groupmates (*nods* to G) because professor don't care as much about peer evaluations as the ones at Baruch do. These are the same one to apply to USACoE. I know that this is a blanket statement, but that's what I heard. And it's federal, so it's believable.

The second one was just as disheartening. "There's really no way you could adequately predict this sort of thing; it's all guessimating." That goes along with what Jenni Bergal mentioned in her book City Adrift: New Orleans Before and After Katrina. She mentions that the USACoE "had used outdated data in its engineering plans ot build the levees and floodwalls and that the wetlands buffering the area... were disappearing."

There's also the many human errors resulting from sloppy work that I heard mentioned more than once (darn elitists). That, combined with bureaucratic red tape in regards to specific levee heights and federal funding, led to low walls that Katrina's storm surge could easily surpass and topple like Jenga blocks.

(As seen here, the levees of the West Bank are no match for a category 3 storm, such as Katrina)

(Note the 10' and 13' walls that shelter the city from Lake Pontchartrain.)

Indeed, it's safe to say that someone was caught with their pants down; it boils down to who. Right after New Orleans was devastated by Katrina, a $924 million protection project was authorized by Congress, in which barriers and levees would be built. However, the completion date, which was scheduled to be 1978 was pushed back to 2008. Since Katrina hit in 2005, that's a moot point. (Talk about procrastination and/or ineptitude; perhaps the elitsts were right about their assessment of the USACoE.)

At the same time, too much was riding on the levees. In a Frontline investigation about Katrina, first-hand footage showed that local Nat'l Guard was unprepared because expect the levees to give way. When the levees did break, they were caught floundering; only 3/4s of the force was active after saving themselves. In the end, the last barrier of defense for the precarious city isn't enforced by guns, but stalwart sentries (both human and geological) and a better work ethic (likewise).

Wednesday, December 9, 2009

"So it's not in Florida?"

“So, New Orleans is in a state of anarchy right now,” he said, in between bites of his BLT. “People are rioting, looting, stealing flat-screens and shit.”

“No kidding?” I responded, more interested in the anarchy rather than New Orleans. I imagined babbling tourists in tawdry Mickey Mouse shirts fleeing while rioters torched Cinderella’s Castle. Police in riot gear were retreating, dropping their Plexiglas shields after failing to hold the line, as bandanna-masked hooligans tossed flaming Molotovs into shattered storefronts.

It was my second year of college upstate, and I was absorbed in my own nocturnal world. The janitor, interrupting my fantasy of urban violence unto hapless Disney mascot, crept out of her little closet, her yellow bucket-on-wheels signaling that the cafeteria was due to close in about 15 minutes.

“Eh. What happened in Florida?” I asked innocently.

“Wha—what?” His eyes then shrunk to slivers as he smirked, gloating at a chance to one-up me. “You’ve got to wake up and smell the coffee. New Orleans isn’t in Florida. Well, it is, but… you know, the hurricane? It just hit New Orleans. In Louisiana.” As if on cue, the wet splash of the mop punctuated his statement.

I knew nothing of Katrina then, and even less of New Orleans. I had no television in my dorm room, and I got the most important news from Darren, the smug asshole in front of me. In my mind’s filing bin, I placed “Look into Hurricane Katrina” and “Research New Orleans” onto the “DO LATER” stack, where it would be forgotten for years to come. I guess now’s a good a time as any.

New Orleans, it would seem, is unique in that it was—well, it was unique in a lot of ways. After the switching of hands and shuffling of feet, New Orleans was passed back and forth between the French and the Spaniards, before it was ultimately sold to the United States. It was from this that determined the basis the city’s spirit—the changing controlled allowed for a more diverse population (French, Spanish, Creole, white, black, slaves and freemen alike) and different attitudes. Indeed, blood was diluted with the mixing of the races, and more notably, as Peirce F. Lewis puts it, “blacks have worked besides whites”; this was progressive at a time when the rest of the nation was still prodding at race relations like cavemen with fire.

History would not be as kind to New Orleans after this. When the blacks, who were arguably the most progressive in comparison to populations in other cities, tried to push for too many rights, tragedy beset them from then on. Though once a paradigm for race relations, New Orleans would become the beaker in which segregation is the catalyst, and less-than-humane compounds would be synthesized. Race relations, tolerable at best, went down a rocky path, and each bump along the way contributed to bruises in our nation’s history (such as Plessey v. Ferguson, Brown v. Board of Ed., white flight, housing projects, etcetera).

That etched out the foundation for New Orleans’s culture. Currently, New Orleans has the upper-class old money with blood that is “Bourbon-blue”; the tourists, who provide $5 billion to the city’s revenue; the shipping and oil industries, and the black underclass, which is romanticized for their music and dancing.

The geography, then, was manipulated to suit all four tiers. “Land” was dredged up from swamps for the two industries, and levees and pumps were built to drain parts of the Pontchartrain Lake so that suburbs could be built for refugees of white flight. The Brown v. Board ruling ended segregation in schools but had the unintended consequence of alienating blue-collared whites and concentrating blacks within specific parishes and public housing project. The culling of blacks into these enclaves also lessens their chances of upward social mobility, and concentrates their masses into a pot of poverty and crime. In this way, New Orleans is just like the rest of America.

It was because of that, then, that led to the incredible oversight in the face of Katrina. According to Douglas Brinkley, New Orleans was a sinking bowl surrounded by levees that were rendered ineffective by the constant dredging of the oil companies. Money that was necessary towards the defense against the ire of Mother Nature was instead focused on the city’s failing public school system. With an elevation that is on average of six feet underwater, New Orleans is just one disaster away from being a soup bowl filled with “HAZMAT gumbo.”

That’s not to say the city isn't a stranger to disasters. New Orleans has a legacy of 300 years of flooding ever since it was founded by a Frenchman named Sieur de Bienville in 1718 to use as shipping port. Though he knew of the slumbering leviathans that are the Mississippi River and the Pontchartrain Lake, Bienville kept New Orleans where it was, for the sake of commerce. Since then, levee failures, floods, and hurricanes have wreaked havoc on the city and taken its toll on the residents. And while the physical aspects of and surrounding New Orleans is inevitably ineffective against Katrina, so too will be the people running the city. It’s safe to say that the top heads of New Orleans—- one Mayor Nagin and a Superintendent Compass—- dropped the ball when it came to the evacuation of the city in light of Katrina, which had just devastated Florida days before. They chose to side with the second tier—- tourists-— by delaying a mandatory evacuation to see if the storm would miss them. It didn't, and as a result, the fourth tier-— the underclass—- took the brunt of the hit.

But that’s for another time.

(Take that, Darren. You smug sonuvabitch.)

Wednesday, December 2, 2009

Just an Afterthought

I had wound my handwraps too tightly around my wrists
And they throb
Just like Yun's face is throbbing now.
Everyone loves an underdog
Just not a dead one

The size-L t-shirt hides his medium build
But it ain't fooling Tom’s fists.

Tom’s heavily chiseled, alabaster
The Greek masterpiece we could never be
His stance is unorthodox
And he’s playing peek-a-boo
But it works for him
Nobody minds.

I advised, “Cinch him!” but the idea is preposterous.
I'm better off telling a nun to deepthroat
Still, Yun keeps going like the little engine that could.
But for every step he takes, Tom drives him back three
If not by choice, then by a cannonball to the head

Or a wrecking ball to the ribs
The sinews on his arms tense
But every jab that takes off never lands
Tom’s batting them aside like a manscaped King Kong
Yun sees the one from below, but not the hook from the side

His reacts like a fish caught and Tom's reeling him in
He’s on the floor
Splayed like an asterisk
Just an afterthought to this bout.

-v