Size does matter after all

Before this exercise, I consulted with many a fresh engineering graduate from prestigious schools with prestigious programs and prestige prestige prestige seeping out of every pore (as well as too many instances of jargon, Greek letters, and MIT/Cooper Union pride [forget about Polytech]). Why did the levees break, and why did no one do anything despite seeing it coming?

There were several answers. First off, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers tend to recruit the "shittier" people from the bottom of that barrel; the good ones are quickly picked up by prestigious (sigh) firms. Just like in Baruch, most of the underachievers cruise by by riding on the back of their groupmates (*nods* to G) because professor don't care as much about peer evaluations as the ones at Baruch do. These are the same one to apply to USACoE. I know that this is a blanket statement, but that's what I heard. And it's federal, so it's believable.

The second one was just as disheartening. "There's really no way you could adequately predict this sort of thing; it's all guessimating." That goes along with what Jenni Bergal mentioned in her book City Adrift: New Orleans Before and After Katrina. She mentions that the USACoE "had used outdated data in its engineering plans ot build the levees and floodwalls and that the wetlands buffering the area... were disappearing."

There's also the many human errors resulting from sloppy work that I heard mentioned more than once (darn elitists). That, combined with bureaucratic red tape in regards to specific levee heights and federal funding, led to low walls that Katrina's storm surge could easily surpass and topple like Jenga blocks.

(As seen here, the levees of the West Bank are no match for a category 3 storm, such as Katrina)

(Note the 10' and 13' walls that shelter the city from Lake Pontchartrain.)

Indeed, it's safe to say that someone was caught with their pants down; it boils down to who. Right after New Orleans was devastated by Katrina, a $924 million protection project was authorized by Congress, in which barriers and levees would be built. However, the completion date, which was scheduled to be 1978 was pushed back to 2008. Since Katrina hit in 2005, that's a moot point. (Talk about procrastination and/or ineptitude; perhaps the elitsts were right about their assessment of the USACoE.)

At the same time, too much was riding on the levees. In a Frontline investigation about Katrina, first-hand footage showed that local Nat'l Guard was unprepared because expect the levees to give way. When the levees did break, they were caught floundering; only 3/4s of the force was active after saving themselves. In the end, the last barrier of defense for the precarious city isn't enforced by guns, but stalwart sentries (both human and geological) and a better work ethic (likewise).